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THE UNHOLY TRINITY: INTELLIGENCE, INTERROGATION AND TORTURE
Amos N. Guiora t and Erin M Page t
1. INTRODUCTION
The greatest contemporary challenge faced by liberal democratic
societies in confronting terrorism is the dilemma of balancing the legitimate
national security interests of the State and the civil liberties of the individ-
ual. Perhaps no issue represents that tension more than the dilemma faced
by democratic societies about how to conduct interrogation of suspected
terrorists in custody. Accounts of abuses that have occurred at Abu Ghraib,
Guantanamo Bay, and Bagram' have served to bring this balancing issue to
the forefront of the debate of how the United States ("U.S.") reacts to terror-
ism.
A number of commissions have investigated the events at Abu
Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay, and Bagram and several members of the Ameri-
can armed forces have been court-martialed. As a result, a one-star general
has been demoted one rank to full colonel and there have been demands for
the resignation of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and others. The pic-
tures from detention centers have been disturbing and distressing. Although
their effect in confronting Americans with a certain reality has been very
powerful, they are not the real story. What the President has termed "a few
bad apples" in referring to Pvt. Charles Graner, Jr., Pfc. Lynndie England,
and Spc. Sabrina Harman, among others, ignores the larger and more criti-
t Professor of Law and Director, Institute for Global Security Law and Policy, Case
Western Reserve University School of Law, Lt. Col. (Ret.) Israel Defense Forces, Judge
Advocate General's Corps. I would like to extend heartfelt thanks to my colleagues and good
friends Professor Robert Strassfeld and Professor Michael Scharf: Prof.
Strassfeld for his insightful comments during the research of the article and for his thoughtful
editorial suggestions on numerous drafts of the article and Prof. Michael Scharf for initiating
and organizing the remarkably successful symposium on "Torture and the War on Terrorism"
held at Case Law School on Oct 7, 2005. The conference's importance and contribution to
public debate on this issue is a reflection of his vision. This article is part of a larger project.
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1 See Tim Golden, In US. Report, Brutal Details of 2 Afghan Inmates' Deaths, N.Y.
TIMES, May 20, 2005, at A l [hereinafter Golden, Brutal Details] (detailing the deaths of two
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cal issues: the relationship between intelligence and interrogation and
whether the confluence of the two must necessarily lead to torture. I propose
that these issues have not yet been fully addressed.
In order to discuss these issues, we shall define the terms used. One
of the realities of the contemporary political discourse regarding terrorism is
a loose usage of language, either for political purposes or due to a lack of
attention.
II. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION
Unlike criminal evidence, which must be submitted to a court of
law and is subject to confrontation via cross-examination, and unlike em-
pirical evidence, which must meet scientific standards, intelligence informa-
tion is largely gathered in the back alleys of the world where dark shadows
rule. The ability to extract information from a source, who in all probability
does not know the true identity of the individual with whom he is meeting
or necessarily the true purpose of the desired information, is an art form
onto itself.
Intelligence information is the backbone of counter-terrorism; with-
out it, governments would not be able to implement any measures against
terrorists. Intelligence information is information that has been gathered and
collected either from human intelligence ("HUMINET") or from signal in-
telligence ("SIGNET") and subsequently analyzed.
A. Human Intelligence
Human intelligence is gathered from sources that, either willingly
or unwillingly, provide intelligence services with information that may or
may not be relevant, valuable, accurate and ultimately actionable. Who is a
source? A source is an individual who, for a variety of reasons is willing to
provide information that incriminates another. Generally an individual will
provide such information for two basic reasons: 1) financial remuneration;
or 2) "wiping his slate clean." In confidential conversations with senior
members of the Israeli General Security Service ("GSS"), this author was
informed that Palestinian informants have included individuals who be-
lieved that Palestinian terrorism was a threat to the larger Palestinian cause
and therefore provided the GSS with intelligence information.
B. Signal Intelligence
Signal intelligence is information received by a variety of listening
devices strategically positioned enabling intelligence officers to intercept
conversations world wide. Sophisticated technology enables analysts to





An interrogation, for purposes of this article, is the questioning of
an individual suspected of either having committed a terrorist act or of be-
ing involved in the planning of an attempted attack. Usually, the interroga-
tion takes place in a room sparsely furnished with a table, a couple of chairs,
pen and paper on the table and the suspect facing the interrogator(s). The
room is not Hilton-like nor should it be; it is a sterile environment perme-
ated with the stench of sweat and fear.
The interrogator seeks the suspect's confession to the crime he be-
lieves the individual has committed. In addition, he wants the suspect to
provide additional information concerning the involvement and location of
others involved in the terrorist operation. This additional information, from
the perspective of the interrogator, is critical to building what is referred to
as the "jig-saw puzzle" of intelligence.
Furthermore, the interrogation process involves the complex devel-
opment of a dependent relationship between the suspect and the interroga-
tor. This relationship requires that the suspect feel comfortable in confessing
to the interrogator. The critical issues are how that relationship develops and
whether the interrogator uses illegal means in its establishment.
IV. TORTURE
To start, I posit unequivocally that torture is wrong-legally, mor-
ally and operationally.
I propose that torture be divided into three categories: 1) interroga-
tion based; 2) functional torture, whereby a ruler, leader or government
demonstrates that there is a "new sheriff in town;" and 3) evil and sadistic
torture. While the methods may bear some similarity, it is important to un-
derstand that these categories have fundamentally different purposes.
Though illegal, the first category is explainable both philosophically
and practically. Harsh measures of interrogation, or what some would call
torture, have been upheld by scholars and courts alike on the basis of le-
gitimate self-defense in order to protect innocent lives. Furthermore, based
on professional experience and knowledge, I submit that torture in certain
interrogation settings is tempting. The burden of sensing that the suspect is
"hiding something" and not being able to coax it out, can no doubt be over-
whelming for the interrogator.
The other two proposed categories are unexplainable under any cir-
cumstance and must be vigorously denounced.
This section is divided into three subsections: 1) definitions of tor-
ture; 2) an analysis of interrogation methods based on an Israeli High Court
of Justice ("HCJ") holding, Ireland v. United Kingdom, and a 1984 Israeli
Commission of Inquiry; and 3) an analysis of both functional torture and
sadistic torture based on an examination of the Bybee memo.
2006]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
A. Definitions of Torture
Webster's Dictionary defines torture as "the infliction of intense
pain (as from burning, crushing, or wounding) to punish, coerce, or afford
sadistic pleasure."2 The U.S. Code makes it a criminal offense for any per-
son outside the U.S. to commit or attempt to commit torture.3 Torture is
defined in the Code as "an act committed by a person acting under the color
of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suf-
fering (other than pain or suffering incident to lawful sanctions) upon an-
other person within his custody or physical control." 4
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions prohibits the use of
torture in any circumstance without actually defining what constitutes tor-
ture. 5 All four of the Geneva Conventions also dictate that the use of torture
is a grave breach.6 The 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, or Punishment ("1984 Convention
Against Torture") defines torture as:
[A]ny act which by severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him
or a third person information or a confession ... or intimidating or coerc-
2 MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, www.m-w.com.
' 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (1994).
4 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (1994). See id. (defining "severe mental pain or suffering" as the
"prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from--(A) the intentional infliction or threat-
ened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering; (B) the administration or application, or
threatened administration or application, of mind-altering substances or other procedures
calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality; (C) the threat of imminent
death; or (D) the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe
physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application of mind-altering substances or
other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality."). See also Letter
from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice to Alberto Gonza-
les, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), reprinted in MARK DANNER, TORTURE AND
TRUTH: AMERICA, ABU GHRAIB, AND THE WAR ON TERROR 109 (2004) (In order to convict a
person of torture, "the prosecution must establish that: (1) the torture occurred outside the
United States; (2) the defendant acted under the color of law; (3) the victim was within the
defendant's custody or physical control; (4) the defendant specifically intended to cause
severe physical or mental pain or suffering; and (5) that the act inflicted severe physical or
mental pain or suffering.").
5 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter
Geneva I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75
U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Pris-
oners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva III];
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 3,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva IV].
6 Geneva I, supra note 5, art. 50; Geneva II, supra note 5, art. 51; Geneva III, supra note
5, art. 130; Geneva IV, supra note 5, art. 147.
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ing... when such pain or suffering is inflicted ... with the consent or ac-
quiescence of a public official .. . [i]t does not include pain or suffering
arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.
7
Furthermore, the 1984 Convention Against Torture states that there are no
exceptional circumstances which may be invoked as justifications of tor-
ture.
8
The International Criminal Court's definition of torture is very simi-
lar to both the U.S. Code definition and the 1984 Convention Against Tor-
ture. It defines torture as "the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffer-
ing, whether physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or under the
control of the accused; except that torture shall not include pain or suffering
arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions." 9 It is im-
portant to note that while many international conventions prohibit the use of
torture, very few actually define it in any manner.'
0
The U.S. Senate, when ratifying the 1984 Convention Against Tor-
ture, gave consent to the Convention subject to its own definition of torture:
[I]n order to constitute torture, an act must be specifically intended to in-
flict severe physical or mental pain or suffering and that mental pain or
suffering refers to prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from: the
intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suf-
fering; the administration or application, or threatened administration or
application, of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to
disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality; the threat of imminent
death; or the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to
death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or applica-
tion of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt
profoundly the senses or personality. " I
The U.S. became a party to the 1984 Convention Against Torture on No-
vember 20, 1994. The ratification of the 1984 Convention Against Torture
7 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment art. 1, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Torture Convention].
8 Id. art. 2.
9 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7(2)(e), July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
10 See Geneva I, supra note 5; Geneva II, supra note 5; Geneva III, supra note 5; Geneva
IV, supra note 5; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Siracusa Principles on the Limitation
and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, An-
nex, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/4 (Sept. 28, 1984) [hereinafter Siracusa Principles].
,1 Sanford Levinson, Brutal Logic, VILLAGE VOICE, May 12, 2004, at 27 (quoting U.S.
Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings to the Convention Against Torture and other
Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 136 CONG. REc. 36
(1990)).
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made effective 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340, 2340A, and 2340B.12 These provisions
of the U.S. Code codified the U.S. obligation to prohibit and prevent torture
as required by the 1984 Convention Against Torture.
The Bybee memo was a "formal legal opinion of the Office of Le-
gal Counsel" which interpreted the 1984 Convention Against Torture and
the corresponding U.S. Code. 13 The American armed forces prior to the
Bybee memo used the definition of torture from 18 U.S.C. § 2340A.14
Based on the Bybee memo analysis, American armed forces narrowed the
definition by stating that "severe" was defined so that the physical or mental
pain "must be of such a high level of intensity that the pain is difficult for
the subject to endure."' 15
Unlike the codified U.S. definition of torture, the State of Israel's
definition does not focus on the specific level of pain but rather defines tor-
ture as pressure that reaches the "level of physical torture or maltreatment of
the suspect, or grievous harm to his honour, which deprives him of his hu-
man dignity."' 16 Israel "has always maintained that the interrogation proce-
dures used by the ... [GSS], to prevent acts of terrorism in Israel, do not
constitute torture as defined by Article 1" of the 1984 Convention Against
Torture. 17
The British government defines torture as the intentional infliction
of "severe pain or suffering on another at the instigation or with the consent
12 Act of April 30, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-236, Title V, Part A, § 506(c), 108 Stat. 463
states that 18 U.S.C. § 2340 et seq. would become effective either on the later date between
the date of enactment of the provision (April 1994) or the date that the U.S. became a party
to the 1984 Convention Against Torture (Nov. 20, 1994).
13 John W. Dean, The Torture Memo by Judge Jay S. Bybee that Haunted Alberto Gonza-
les's Confirmation Hearings, FINDLAW, Jan. 14, 2005, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/
dean/20050114.html.
14 Cf Huam Rights First, U.S. Law for Prosecuting Torture and Other Serious Abuses
Committed by Civilians Abroad, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, http://humanrightsfirst.org/us law/
detainees/ustorture laws.htm (discussing military law and U.S. Code provisions that are
applicable to members of the U.S. armed forces).
15 Jess Bravin, Pentagon Report Set Framework for Use of Torture: Security or Legal
Factors Could Trump Restrictions, Memo to Rumsfeld Argued, WALL ST. J., June 7, 2004, at
Al.
16 Alan Baker, Legal Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Opening Statement to Second
Periodic Report of Israel Concerning the Implementation of The Convention Against Torture
(May 15, 1998), http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/1990_1999/1998/5/Alan+Baker-
+Opening+Statement+to+Second+Periodic+R.htm?DisplayMode=print.
17 Yaakov Levy, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations
Office in Geneva, Opening Statement Consideration of Israel's Third Periodic Report to the






or acquiescence-i) of a public official; or (ii) of a person acting in an offi-
cial capacity;" and the "official or other person is performing or purporting
to perform his official duties when he instigates the commission of the of-
fence or consents to or acquiesces in it.' 18 According to British law, "it is
immaterial whether the pain or suffering is physical or mental and whether
it is caused by an act or an omission."' 19
B. Interrogation Based Torture
1. 1984 Israeli Commission of Inquiry
In the aftermath of the 1967 Six-Day War and the subsequent estab-
lishment of the Israel Defense Forces Military Government in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip, the GSS assumed responsibility for the interrogation
of Palestinians suspected of terrorist activities. From 1967 to 1984, com-
plaints regarding torture were regularly lodged, not only by Palestinians
prisoners, but also by Palestinian and Israeli human rights groups. These
complaints were largely dismissed as exaggerated.
In 1984, a National Committee of Inquiry 2° concluded that con-
trolled, moderate physical duress could be allowed in "ticking bomb" inter-
rogations. 2 1 A "ticking bomb" interrogation occurs "when a bomb is known
to have been placed in a public area and will undoubtedly explode causing
immeasurable human tragedy if its location is not revealed at once. 22
18 Criminal Justice Act, 1988, c.33, § 134(a)(1)-(2), (b) (Eng.)
'9 Id. § 134(3).
20 Known as the Landau Commission, named after Moshe Landau, a Supreme Court Jus-
tice, the Commission was established in the aftermath of the killing of a Palestinian terrorist
by a senior member of the GSS. The terrorist was killed in the wake of an IDF rescue mis-
sion of a bus, which had been hijacked by Palestinian terrorists in Israel and then comman-
deered to the Gaza Strip. A newspaper photographer captured on film the GSS official and
the terrorist leaving the bus. When the picture was published on the front cover of the news-
paper, the media attempted to determine the identity and whereabouts of the detained terror-
ist. It was discovered that minutes after the picture was taken the Palestinian was brutally
killed by the GSS official, who claimed that he was acting on the orders of the Head of the
GSS. The Head in turn claimed that he was acting upon orders he received directly from the
Prime Minister, Yitzhak Shamir. During the course of its investigation, the Committee of
Inquiry learned that GSS agents when called to testify in court concerning confessions made
by suspected Palestinian terrorists systematically lied when asked whether suspects had
confessed of their own free will and volition. Furthermore, the Commission discovered that
one of its members, a senior GSS official, regularly updated the Head of the GSS regarding
the Commission's daily proceedings and prepared GSS agents prior to their testimony before
the Commission. The Commission also discovered that the GSS had attempted to frame a
Brigadier General for the murder of the terrorist.
21 See HCJ 5100/94 Public Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Israel [1999] IsrSC 46(2),
16, available at http://www.derechos.org/human-rights/mena/doc/torture.html.
22 Id. 14.
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Therefore, if the GSS strongly suspected that the detainee knew the location
of the ticking bomb and that the information in the detainee's possession
could prevent that bomb from exploding, limited means of physical duress
could be used. The report included a section available to the public as well
as a confidential portion detailing the physical means that were permissi-
ble.23 According to various media reports, the Commission held that the
following interrogation methods were legal: wall standing, the playing of
loud music, sleep deprivation, physical discomfort through manipulation of
room temperature, sitting in an uncomfortable position, and the wearing of a
hood. Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, in ticking bomb situa-
tions, the detainee could be violently shaken.24
2. Shaking Technique and the "Ticking Bomb"
Shaking has been defined by the HCJ as "the forceful shaking of the
suspect's upper torso, back and forth, repeatedly, in a manner which causes
the neck and head to dangle and vacillate rapidly., 25 The consequences of
shaking are disputed but may include serious brain damage and harm to the
spinal cord, which can cause the suspect to "lose consciousness, vomit and
urinate uncontrollably, and suffer serious headaches. 26
In the aftermath of the Commission's report, the GSS implemented
the "shaking" technique for "ticking bombs." However, a series of petitions
filed with the HCJ 27 argued that "ticking bomb" had been expanded to in-
clude virtually every Palestinian detainee instead of the imposition of duress
being limited only to those cases where a ticking bomb truly existed. Ac-
cording to the petitions, torture became a "bureaucratic routine" for the
GSS. 28 Nevertheless, the HCJ repeatedly denied the petitions29 without ad-dressing the legality of shaking.
23 B'Tselem, The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territo-
ries, Background on the High Court of Justice's Decision, B'Tselem,
www.btselem.org/english/Torture/Background.asp [hereinafter Background on the High
Court's Decision].
24 See See.HCJ 5100/94 Public Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Israel [1999] IsrSC
46(2), 15, available at http://www.derechos.org/human-rights/mena/doc/torture.html.
25 Id. 9.
26 id.
27 According to a 1968 legal opinion written by then Attorney General Meir Shamgar,
Palestinians or those acting on their behalf, may seek redress against the executive in the
HCJ regarding either actions taken or actions contemplated. Depending on the matter at
issue, the Court may hear the petition immediately and issue a restraining order asking the
executive to explain the considerations involved.





Other countries also have allowed the use of torture or interrogation
methods that harm the suspect, in order to stop a "ticking bomb." One ex-
ample of this occurred in the Philippines in 1994-1995 when the authorities
received information that Ramzi Yousef, one of the masterminds of the
1993 World Trade Center bombing, planned to blow up a dozen jumbo jets
over the Pacific Ocean. 30 The Philippine authorities were able to foil the
plan after they tortured a suspected terrorist for sixty-seven days. 31 There-
fore, in that instance, torture successfully stopped a "ticking bomb."
On at least one occasion in Israel, a detainee died during the course
of his interrogation because of the shaking technique, which led to discus-
sion regarding both its legality and effectiveness. 32 Since the death of a
shaken detainee in 1995, the HCJ has explicitly stated that "shaking is a
prohibited investigation method" as it "harms the suspect's body... [and]
violates his dignity. 33 Thus, Israel no longer allows the "shaking" interro-
gation method, even if it would help save civilian lives, the way torture did
for the Philippine authorities in 1994-1995.
3. HCJ 5100/94
In Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. State of Israel and
General Security Service, the HCJ ruled that while the GSS had the author-
ity to conduct interrogations, their ability to employ certain methods would
be restricted in the future. 3 The court limited the GSS investigators to the
same powers as any police officer stating that neither "possess the authority
to employ physical means which infringe upon a suspect's liberty during the
interrogation, unless these means are inherently accessory to the very es-
sence of an interrogation and are both fair and reasonable." 35 The court spe-
cifically prohibited forcing a suspect to crouch on the tips of his toes for
five-minute intervals as "it does not serve any purpose inherent to an inves-
30 Tung Yin, Ending the War on Terrorism One Terrorist at a Time: A Non-Criminal
Detention Model for Holding and Releasing Guantanamo Bay Detainees, 29 HARv. J. L.
PUB. POL'Y 149, 157 (2005) (citing THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 109 (2003) and ALAN M.
DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS 138, 249 n. 10 (2002)).
31 Id. at 157-158 (citing ALAN DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS 137, 249 n.10
(2002)).
32 See AMNESTY INT'L, COMBATING TORTURE: A MANUAL FOR ACTION (2002) (describing
that Palestinian detainee Abd al-Samad Harizat was sent unconscious to the hospital twenty-
four hours after his arrest by the GSS on April 22, 1995. He died three days later due to
hemorrhaging within the skull overlying the brain, which results from sudden jarring move-
ments of the head.).
"3 See HCJ 5100/94 Public Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Israel [1999] IsrSC 46(2),
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tigation. '' 36 Concerning placing a hood on the suspect's head, the court
states that limiting the eye contact between suspects is a legitimate consid-
eration, but having a hood that covers the entire head and causes the suspect
to suffocate is forbidden. The court recommended that the GSS find a less
harmful means to prevent eye contact and communication between detain-
ees. The court instructed the State that usage of a ventilated sack allowing
the suspect to breath was insufficient. 37
The court did not explicitly state that the use of loud music was al-
ways prohibited. The court held that in the circumstances of the current
case, loud music when combined with an impermissible method is forbid-
den.38 Furthermore, the court held sleep deprivation may be allowed as an
"inevitable result of an interrogation, or one of its side effects." 39 However,
the suspect cannot be "intentionally deprived of sleep for a prolonged period
of time, for the purpose of tiring him out or 'breaking him.,,
40
The court specifically defined interrogation as "an exercise seeking
to elicit truthful answers., 41 The court recognized that interrogations inher-
ently infringe on a suspect's freedom even without the use of physical
means. While the court did not explicitly define torture, it held that legality
of interrogation techniques is "deduced from the propriety of... purpose
and from its methods. 42 Nevertheless, what is irrefutable is that the HCJ
definitively held that physical duress may not be implemented except in
those very limited cases where the Head of the GSS personally authorizes
such an exception, provided that a "ticking bomb" is genuinely suspected to
exist. The court held that it is "prepared to assume that. .. the 'necessity'
defence is open to all, particularly an investigator, acting in an organiza-
tional capacity of the State in interrogations of that nature" and that "the
'necessity' exception is likely to arise in instances of 'ticking time
bombs.' 43 However, the court also stated that the physical means used
must still be "inherently accessory to the very essence of an interrogation
and... [be] both fair and reasonable." 44 Therefore, the court held that while
some instances of physical means are legitimate, they would be determined
on a case-by-case basis as the necessity defense inherently cannot be de-












The decision in HCJ 5100/94 has stood the test of time. Interroga-
tors have commented that the ruling necessitated the development and hon-
ing of advanced psychological interrogation methods in the place of more
physical means.45 Whether the ruling was "popular" among the intelligence
community, who had to search for new legitimate means of interrogation, is
ultimately irrelevant because the court's decision that certain interrogation
methods are prohibited must be respected as the essence of the rule of law.
4. International Judicial Precedent
The Reagan Administration relied on Ireland v. United Kingdom in
arguing that torture is limited to "extreme, deliberate and unusually cruel
practices. ' '46 In Ireland, the European Court of Human Rights analyzed
methods of interrogation used by the United Kingdom when interrogating
detainees suspected of terrorist activities in Northern Ireland.47 The court
held that while measures including wall standing, hooding, subjection to
noise, sleep deprivation and deprivation of food and drink were inhuman
and degrading, they did not amount to torture.4 8 The Court stated:
Although the five techniques, as applied in combination, undoubtedly
amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment, although their object was
the extraction of confessions, the naming of others and/or information and
although they were used systematically, they did not occasion suffering of
the particular intensity and cruelty implied by the word torture. 49
5. U.S. Interrogation Methods
Section 2(c)(1) of a memo written by LTC Jerald Pfifer on October
11, 2001 specified which Category III interrogation techniques 50 may be
used against detainees held in Guantanamo. These included "the use of sce-
narios designed to convince the detainee that death or severely painful con-
45 Confidential conversations between author and senior GSS members.
46 Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice to
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under
18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), reprinted in DANNER, supra note 4, at 139 [here-
inafter Bybee Memo] (quoting Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978)).
47 Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978).
48 Id. 167. See also DANNER, supra note 4, at 139.
49 Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978) (emphasis added by
DANNER, supra note 4, at 140).
5o Category III techniques require special approval and are "required for a very small
percentage of the most uncooperative detainees." They may be used in a carefully coordi-
nated manner to help interrogate exceptionally resistant detainees. Memorandum from Jerald
Phifer, Dir., J2 to Michael E. Dunlavey, Commander, Joint Task Force 170, U.S. Dep't of
Def., Request for Approval of Counter-resistance Strategies (Oct. 11, 2002), reprinted in
DANNER, supra note 4, at 167.
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sequences are imminent for him and/or his family." 51 Also allowed, if ap-
proved "by the Commanding General with appropriate legal review and
information to Commander," is the "use of a wet towel and dripping water
to induce the misperception of suffocation.
52
Water-boarding, a Category III technique, induces the detainee to
believe that death is imminent. This technique requires that the detainee be
strapped or held down to induce the sensation of drowning as either water is
repeatedly poured down the individual's throat or the head is immersed in
water. Detainees who have experienced water-boarding have universally
expressed an overwhelming fear because the method prevents breathing.
Furthermore, according to some reports, a number of individuals have died
as a result of water-boarding.53 There is little doubt that this technique
represents torture, yet in a subsequent memo, Secretary of Defense Rums-
feld ordered water-boarding be used only in those cases he personally ap-
proved.54
6. Controls on Interrogation Methods
Professor Alan Dershowitz advocates "controlling and limiting the
use of torture by means of a warrant or some other mechanism of account-
ability." 55 The essence of this argument relates to torture in the context of
the "ticking bomb" theory.56 The argument propounded by Dershowitz is
philosophically and legally akin to self-defense, for example, how a nation
protects itself in the face of a mass terror attack. As mentioned above, tor-
ture in the context of a legitimate interrogation with proper controls is ex-
plainable, though according to both international law and American domes-
tic law, it is illegal. The distinction between torture and methods of harsh
interrogation referred to in Ireland and as approved by the Israeli Commis-
sion of Inquiry is critical. 57
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Human Rights Watch, 'Stress and Duress' Techniques Used Worldwide, June 1, 2004,
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/06/0 1/usint8632_txt.htm (In the submarine technique, the
victim's head is covered with a cloth hood and intermittently forced into a vessel containing
water, similar to water-boarding, has been used by many countries (Argentina, Chile, Uru-
guay, Zimbabwe, and China). In several instances, for example in Zimbabwe and Uruguay,
its use has lead to the death of the suspect.).
54 Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld, Sec'y of Def., U.S. Dep't of Def. to Commander,
U.S. Southern Command, Counter-resistance Techniques (Jan. 15, 2003), reprinted in
DANNER, supra note 4, at 183.
55 Alan Dershowitz, Tortured Reasoning, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION 257 (Sanford Levin-
son ed., 2004). Professor Alan Dershowitz is a law professor at Harvard Law School and
world renowned scholar on terrorism and the law.
56 See supra Part 1V.B.2.
57 See supra Part V.B.3-5.
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The "ticking bomb" argument 58 is valid if it is implemented only in
those cases where a sound basis for a ticking bomb exists and not as a con-
venient catch-all justification. In addition, the "ticking bomb" theory re-
quires hands-on supervision and oversight by the head of the security ser-
vices. Such matters cannot be left to the discretion of the individual interro-
gator, no matter how dedicated and skilled he or she may be.
The meeting place between the interrogator and the suspect, as de-
scribed above, is fraught with tension; however, according to the Israeli
High Court of Justice, liberal democratic regimes must have self-imposed
restraints. These restraints result in what Barak has termed fighting terror-
ism with "one hand tied behind" the back. 59 Liberal democratic regimes
must be vigilant at all times, not only regarding the rule of law, but also to a
finely tuned moral compass. As described below, these two principles were
disregarded with respect to interrogation torture in Abu Ghraib, Guan-
tanamo Bay and Bagram.6 °
In the following sections, we shall explore torture that induces men-
tal suffering akin to the physical pain required to meet the torture definition.
The humiliation and degradation suffered by detainees at the hands of U.S.
military personnel is defined as evil and sadistic torture.
C. Functional Torture and Sadistic Torture
In the aftermath of September 11 th and the subsequent American-
led coalition invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the Bush Administration
was confronted with legal and moral dilemmas regarding the limits of
counter-terrorism.
Did the U.S., as a liberal democratic society, intend to fight with
one hand behind its back, or would it fight with both hands and ignore the
rule of law? This is the critical question liberal democratic societies face
when determining how they shall combat terrorism. Will such societies be
true to their moral ethos even in times of horrific terror attacks or will they
place in temporary abeyance those very morals that distinguish them from
the terrorist? Liberal democratic societies cannot allow themselves the lux-
ury of disregarding their ethical and moral ethos. In doing so they lose their
raison d'etre and lower themselves to the level of the terrorist. If they do so,
they have lost what they are fighting for.
A careful reading of Professor Mark Danner's book, Torture and
Truth: America, Abu Ghraib and the War on Terror,6 1 suggests that Barak's
58 See supra Part IV.B.2.
" HCJ 5100/94 Public Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Israel [1999] IsrSC 46(2), 39,
available at http://www.derechos.org/human-rights/mena/doc/torture.html.
60 Golden, Brutal Details, supra note 1; Golden, Army Faltered, supra note 1.
61 DANNER, supra note 4.
20061
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
one-handed approach was not adopted. In the context of the debate regard-
ing the legality and implementation of torture, the memo drafted by then
Assistant Attorney General (now Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge) Jay
Bybee stands out as most disturbing. Though Danner's book suggests that
there was debate within the Administration regarding the legality of torture,
ultimately the policy adopted as suggested in the memo, reflects the worst in
policy-making and legal advice.
The memo's language, implicitly and explicitly, may have contrib-
uted to the horrific events that transpired at Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay,
Bagram, and additional secret facilities. The legalistic hair-splitting, which
can generously be described as "mental gymnastics," is best brought to light
in the argument regarding "prolonged mental harm., 62 The Bybee memo
argues that the harm must be "endured over some period of time" and so
mental strain from a long intense interrogation would not be considered
prolonged unless it extended for a number of months or years.63 According
to the Bybee memo, for an act to be defined as torture the interrogator must
have intended to cause the detainee prolonged harm. 64 Therefore, if an inter-
rogator did not intend to cause harm lasting beyond the interrogation itself,
the actions could not be considered torture regardless of how long the pain
actually lasts.
1. Abu Ghraib
It is irrelevant whether the soldiers posing with the Iraqis in Abu
Ghraib ever met Mr. Bybee or read his memo. It is equally insignificant
whether their superiors were acquainted with it. What is relevant is that
someone's superior read it and understood its true meaning-that the
American government endorses and therefore encourages torture. The at-
tempt to distinguish between various degrees of pain that may be inflicted
(mental or physical), though interesting from a theoretical and intellectual
perspective, does a fundamental disservice to the only individuals who mat-
ter-those in the field who are on the front-lines of counter-terrorism and
the detainees.
Counter-terrorism is not an abstract legal exercise; rather it involves
real decisions made by people "on the ground." The greatest disservice that
can be done to these individuals-generally young people, men and women
alike-is to place them in a situation with unclear and murky instructions.
In files obtained by the New York Times, there is a clear demonstration of
the failure of the command structure to teach those in the field what actions
62 Bybee Memo, supra note 46, at 121.
63 Id. at 120.
' Id. at 121.
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are and are not permissible regarding detainees. 65 The documents quote the
individuals in charge of detention centers asking for clarification from the
Staff Judge Advocate regarding what interrogations techniques may prop-
erly be used; however, no training was ever offered.66 The Bybee memo is
in direct conflict with that very important command principle of the com-
mander telling his troops what is and is not acceptable.
This difficulty of those on the ground is exacerbated not only when
their training is minimal at best, but also when those who have sent them
seek to obtain plausible deniability.
The President's oft-repeated comment, that America is a nation of
laws and those involved in Abu Ghraib are "bad apples," is disingenuous.
The conduct of Private Charles Graner, Jr., Private First Class Lynndie Eng-
land, Specialist Sabrina Harman, among others is inexcusable, criminal, and
sadistic. However, the environment that allowed for the horrific abuses at
Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay, and Bagram was created by the Administra-
tion's own manipulation of the definition of torture.
The Bybee memorandum's overly legalistic, almost painful to read,
hair-splitting arguments attempting to find a justification for the torture of
detainees reflects the most inappropriate and ultimately damaging response
to September 11 th. I would suggest that the pictures that shocked the world
and caused America such enormous damage in the Middle East were a re-
sult-it is insignificant whether direct or indirect-of that memo. Even once
the soldiers in the field acted impermissibly, their commanders and the
leadership of the U.S. did very little, if anything, to correct it or secure jus-
tice for the victims until their inaction was disclosed by the media.67 Not
only is that most disturbing, but also, in the context of this paper, it raises
important questions that must be addressed.
2. The Role of Policy-Makers
Policy, domestic or foreign, must not only be legal, but will ulti-
mately be judged by its effectiveness. Policy advisors, be they generalists or
specialists such as a legal counsel, must be confident that their policy rec-
ommendations serve not only the short term political interests of a particular
65 Golden, Army Faltered, supra note 1; Golden, Brutal Details, supra note 1.
66 Golden, Army Faltered, supra note 1. Abuses at the Bagram Detention Center in Af-
ghanistan were poorly investigated which allowed the same military intelligence unit that
lacked command in Afghanistan to be deployed to Abu Ghraib three months later without
any indication that proper training or direction as to permissible actions were given before
the deployment to Abu Ghraib.
67 Id. The investigation, while still open, was at a standstill until a March 4, 2003 article in
the New York Times reported that at least one of the deaths of a detainee had been reported as
a homicide. Carlotta Gall, US. Military Investigating Death of Afghan in Custody, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 4, 2003, at Al.
2006]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
superior but also-and not less importantly-long term, national strategic
goals.
On this note, I would suggest that the Bybee memorandum fails in
ways that neither Mr. Bybee nor his superiors imagined.68
An analysis of the memo in the context both of September 11 th and
the two sections outlined above, intelligence and interrogation, shows a
national leadership literally scrambling to respond to the terror attacks. In-
deed the U.S. entered a new age at 8:43 a.m. on September 11, 2001, and
has been playing catch-up, trying to make up for lost time in attempting to
level the playing field between itself and global terrorism. As has previously
occurred in American history, there is a tendency to go overboard under
such circumstances. 69 The question as it relates to the issue at hand was
whether the U.S. government was going to "throw caution to the wind" and
adopt a philosophy reflective of"a la guerre comme a la guerre."
I would argue that such an approach is not only in violation of U.S.
law70 under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A and international law, especially as
the 1984 Convention Against Torture explicitly states that there are no ex-
ceptions that would allow for the use of torture, 71 but just as importantly, it
violates principles of "morality in armed conflict.
7 2
68 If they did imagine in advance, then woe to us.
69 See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635 (1863); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944).
70 The explicit definition of "severe" given in 18 U.S.C. §2340A is redefined in the Bybee
memo to require that the pain not only be prolonged but that a high level of intensity exists.
Bybee Memo, supra note 46, at 116.
71 Torture Convention, supra note 7, art. 2. See also Geneva I, supra note 5, art. 3; Geneva
II, supra note 5, art. 3; Geneva III, supra note 5, art. 3; Geneva IV, supra note 5, art, 3. Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 7 1, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen.
Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
supra note 10. Siracusa Principles, supra note 10. Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 7(2)(e).
All the aforementioned documents prohibit torture without stating any situation which would
allow for the use of torture.
72 In September, 2003 the Israel Defense Forces, School of Military Law, under my com-
mand, produced an interactive training video developed in conjunction with commanders.
The video teaches soldiers an 11 point code-of-conduct based on international law, Israeli
law, and the IDF Code. Commanders' and soldiers' personal responsibility to respect interna-
tional humanitarian law requirements and the dignity of civilians is emphasized. The video's
fundamental message is that violations of the principle of morality in armed conflict are not
only in violation of international law, but ultimately aid only the enemy. The Bybee memo is
a classic example not only of a violation of the morality of armed conflict but paradoxically
an unintended advantage given to America's enemies in the Middle East.
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3. Implementation of the Bybee Memo
In seeking to define what torture is, Bybee quotes from the 1990
Congressional testimony of Mr. Mark Richard, Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice:
[T]orture is understood to be that barbaric cruelty which lies at the top of
the pyramid of human rights misconduct.... As applied to physical tor-
ture, there appears to be some degree of consensus that the concept in-
volves conduct, the mere mention of which sends chills down one's spine.
... [T]he needle under the fingernail, the application of electrical shock to
the genital area, the piercing of eyeballs, etc. 73
As to mental torture, according to Bybee, Richard testified:
[N]o international consensus had emerged as to what degree of mental suf-
fering is required to constitute torture but. . . severe mental pain or suffer-
ing "does not encompass the normal legal compulsions which are properly
a part of the criminal justice system: interrogation, incarceration, prosecu-
tion, compelled testimony against a friend, etc.-notwithstanding the fact
that they may have the incidental effect of producing mental strain." 74
While I doubt that Mr. Richard and Mr. Bybee intended for the phrase "top
of the pyramid" to be understood literally by Private Graner and his col-
leagues, the picture from Abu Ghraib forever seared into the collective
memory of the Arab world will be that of naked Iraqi men forced by U.S.
soldiers to form themselves into a human pyramid under the enthusiastic
eye of American women.
The repeated use of certain techniques at Abu Ghraib, such as those
that mocked Islamic beliefs, belies the Bush Administration's claim that this
was the work of a few "bad apples." At least one of the methods used is "an
arcane torture method known only to veterans of the interrogation trade. 75
While perhaps any National Guardsman or reservist hastily pressed into
service could probably realize that Koranic abuse would hurt and offend
religious Muslims, the repeated use of methods that go to the detainees'
religious beliefs, for example their sexual morality and attitudes about dogs,
suggests that people higher in the chain of command with some knowledge
of Islamic culture allowed the creation of the environment in which the
abuses occurred.76 One example of a reservist relying on the example set by
73 Bybee Memo, supra note 46, at 131 (emphasis added) (citing Convention Against Tor-
ture: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. On Foreign Relations, 101st Cong. 16 (1990)) (tes-
timony of Mark Richard, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice).
74 Id.
75 John Barry et al., The Roots of Torture, NEWSWEEK, May 24, 2004, at 26.
76 See generally Edward T. Pound & Kit R. Roane, Hell on Earth, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., July 19, 2004, at 10.
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superiors is that of Army Captain Donald Reese. As the newly installed
warden of part of Abu Ghraib, Captain Reese visited it for the first time in
October of 2003. He was a reservist and window-blinds salesman in civilian
life who admits that he was ill-prepared for being warden of Abu Ghraib, as
he had never been in a prison, even to visit, and "knew nothing of the Ge-
neva Conventions, which specify conditions for humane treatment of enemy
prisoners of war and others."" When he arrived and saw many of the pris-
oners without clothing, Captain Reese was assured by Army intelligence
officers that there was nothing "illegal or wrong about it" and that "strip-
ping the prisoners was a tried-and-true intelligence tactic used to make the
prisoners uncomfortable. 78
The litany of the humiliations and degradations inflicted by Ameri-
can soldiers is literally mind-boggling: building naked human pyramids,
staging menstruation, forcing detainees to masturbate, servicewomen fon-
dling themselves in the presence of the detainees, forcing the detainees to
walk while leashed to a chain as if they were dogs, and mishandling of the
Koran.79 While Mr. Bybee and others in the Administration may argue that
the above actions did not cause physical pain, I would argue that the mental
pain and suffering inflicted is no less severe than physical pain for all are
tantamount to profound violations of Islamic belief.80 While the pain and
suffering were mental, not physical, they constitute torture because of their
severity and under the definitions discussed earlier.
In their actions, Graner and others reflected both sadistic and func-
tional torture. By deliberately violating basic Islamic tenets in an Islamic
country, members of the U.S. military, whose actions were reflective of
Administration policy, clearly demonstrated to the local population that
there was a new sheriff in town. The concept of the new sheriff was articu-
lated-advertently or inadvertently-by President Bush's now famous
"bring 'em" statement. Functional torture represents a new order: in Af-
ghanistan the replacement of the Taliban, in Iraq the downfall of Saddam.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Thom Shanker, Inquiry by U.S. Reveals 5 Cases of Koran Harm, N.Y. TIMES, May 27,
2005, at Al.
80 Islam 101, http://www.islaml0l.com/rights/hrM2.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2006). Im-
portant aspects of the Charter of Human Rights granted by Islam is respect and protection for
a woman's chastity, an individual's right to freedom or the right not to be a slave, equality of
men, and the right to safety of life. Id. Homosexuality and sexual promiscuity are also for-
bidden. Many of the actions performed by Private Graner et al., showed fundamental and




Torture predicated on self-defense (the "ticking bomb") is not akin
to humiliation and degradation in violation of religious beliefs. 8' In the
opinion of this writer, the actions of Graner and others are tantamount to
causing great mental anguish, which is defined as torture and therefore
banned according to 18 U.S.C. § 2340, 1984 Convention Against Torture,
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and the definition given
by the U.S. Senate when it gave consent to ratify the 1984 Convention
Against Torture.
While indeed Graner and others must be punished,82 the issue at
hand goes far beyond the actions of a "few bad apples." The question that
must truly be addressed is how do policymakers construct policy reflective
both of an operational reality (counter-terrorism) and the rule of law while
balancing between legitimate national security concerns and equally legiti-
mate rights of the individual.
The Bybee memo is an excellent example of how not to develop, ar-
ticulate, and implement policy. It is wrong legally and it creates an envi-
ronment whereby the actions of Graner and others were inevitable. In the
context of the U.S. attempting to develop a new Middle East, it dramatically
fails on the policy front.
That having been said, the theories such as those postulated both in
the Landau Commission and by Dershowitz are conceivably explainable
even though highly problematic legally, morally, and operationally. They
are legally problematic because the distinction between harsh yet permissi-
ble methods of interrogation and torture is tenuous and requires superb
training and outstanding command and control mechanisms. This is particu-
larly difficult to implement successfully in the context of operational
counter-terrorism. However, should a government decide to implement such
measures, the potential consequences must be clear to decision and policy
makers alike who must not allow themselves-nor be allowed-to hide
behind "plausible deniability." There are few things more demoralizing and
81 See supra Part IV.B.2.
82 New Hearing for Soldier over Abu Ghraib Charges, CNN.coM, May 19, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/05/19/england.courtmartial/. Private Graner was found
guilty on nine of the ten major counts, guilty for three photographs and guilty of each charge
of abuse and is currently serving a sentence of ten years. A mistrial in Private First Class
England's court-martial was recently declared after Private Graner testified at Private First
Class England's sentencing phase.). See also Harmon Gets 6 Months for Abu Ghraib Scan-
dal, USATODAY.COM, May 17, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-05-17-
harman-convicted_x.htm. Specialist Harmon was sentenced to six months after being con-
victed on six of seven counts for her role in Abu Ghraib. Specialist Harmon and Private
Graner are the only two soldiers to be tried in the scandal as others have arranged plea bar-
gains.
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debilitating to those in the front lines. Should decision and policy makers
decide to allow the implementation of measures such as those discussed in
Ireland, then the guidelines must be clearly articulated and must inherently
include limits which err on this side of caution.
The question will inevitably be asked: if an interrogator is con-
vinced that the detainee knows on which bus the bomb is placed and when
is it to go off, can the measures become harsher? The reader is asked to un-
derstand that this writer was professionally involved for almost two decades
in such matters. My involvement was not in the context of an abstract, intel-
lectual exercise but rather hands-on legal and policy advice regarding
counter-terrorism. I have ordered the detention of hundreds of Palestinian
suspected of terrorism and have spent literally hundreds of hours in deten-
tion facilities with suspects and interrogators alike. I have had the opportu-
nity to examine the conditions of suspects and have been subjected-like
them-to the loud and obnoxious music, have clearly met with sleep de-
prived individuals who complained about the temperature in the detention
facility. In addition, I have seen detainees sitting for extended periods in
very uncomfortable positions with hoods over their heads. While the reader
may find these measures difficult, possibly repugnant, it is also true that an
interrogation inherently is not meant to be a pleasant conversation between
friends over coffee and cake.
Ultimately, the interrogation is a vital cog in counter-terrorism.
Based on the information the interrogator learns, additional suspects may be
detained and the bomb may well be neutralized before innocent civilians are
killed. The ultimate question is one of balance. Therefore, to answer the
question asked above-yes, harsh methods may be implemented provided
the interrogator is highly trained and that the head of the organization has
personally approved the decision and that there is hands-on oversight. How-
ever, torture as described by Richard 83 and as performed by Graner and
others is prohibited by law and by a well-tuned moral compass.
The Bybee memo has done the U.S. a great disservice; untrained
and unsupervised individuals seemingly with their own sadistic agenda
acted in its spirit. Ultimately, according to many U.S. military sources, in-
telligence that could form the basis for counterterrorism measures was not
received.
A final thought--one of the significant problems with torture is that
a detainee in order to stop the pain will tell his interrogator what he thinks
he wants to hear either consciously (disinformation) or unconsciously (mis-
information). From an operational perspective, both are highly problematic.
83 Bybee Memo, supra note 46, at 130-32 (emphasis added) (citing Convention Against
Torture: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. On Foreign Relations, 101st Cong. 16 (1990))
(testimony of Mark Richard, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Jus-
tice).
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Limited resources can be misdirected (a military force will stop bus number
5, rather than bus number 7 that actually has the bomb). That in and of it-
self, is cause enough to forbid torture.

